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 Summary: Key aspects of economic growth and sustainable consumption are highlighted 
in the context of a modified neoclassical growth model. If we consider the topic of 
optimum growth in a broader context the notion of efficient specialization – in accordance 
with relative factor endowment - has to be distinguished from optimum specialization. For 
most resource rich countries long term economic growth is possible, namely if sufficient 
investment in research and development plus education is realized in the context of a 
dynamic open economy. As the exploitation of natural resources is likely to decline in the 
very long run in many countries – including in Russia – the level of the growth path should 
be expected to reduce in the steady state. Adequate long term emphasis on innovation 
dynamics is crucial for sustained growth where innovation should include strong emphasis 
on renewable energies and energy-efficient technologies. Here international cooperation 
among countries could be very useful and new joint international projects among countries 
from different continents indeed should be explored.   
 
 
Zusammenfassung:  In dieser Studie werden wesentliche Aspekte zum Wirtschafts-
wachstum und nachhaltigem gesamtwirtschaftlichen Konsum im Kontext eines 
modifizierten neoklassischen Wachstumsmodell behandelt. Berücksichtigt man die Theorie 
eines optimalen Wachstums im weiten Sinne, so muss der Gedanke einer effizienten 
Spezialisierung  - im Zusammenhang mit einer relativen Faktorausstattung – von einem 
optimalen Spezialisierungsgrad unterschieden werden. Für die meisten ressourcenreichen 
Länder ist langfristiges Wachstum dann möglich, wenn genügend Investitionen in 
Forschung und Entwicklung sowie in Bildung vorgenommen werden. Da langfristig 
gesehen der Abbau von natürlichen Ressourcen mit langfristig reduzierter Rate erfolgt – 
auch in Russland – dürfte das Niveau des Wachstumspfades im steady state zurückgehen. 
Daher ist der Aspekt langfristiger Innovationsdynamik von besonderer Bedeutung für 
nachhaltiges Wachstum, vor allem hinsichtlich erneuerbarer Energien und energie-
effizienter Technologien. Dabei wären internationale Kooperationen zwischen Ländern 
sehr nützlich und sollten durch neue gemeinsame internationale, kontinentübergreifende 
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1.  Introduction 
Long run expansion of real income is a natural goal of societies, and for countries with a 
medium per capita income (or a low per capita income) economic catching-up with leading 
economies also is a typical goal. Ultimately, people are not so much interested in a high 
real income but in a high, stable and safe level of per capita consumption; safe is meant in 
terms of military security which suggests to place some political emphasis on creating a 
friendly international network of partner countries – or alternatively, to spend a high share 
of resources on the military which comes, however, at considerable opportunity costs. 
Stable consumption is somehow linked to the variance of real income whose modeling 
requires a stochastic growth model. We disregard uncertainty and risk, respectively, 
instead we will focus on a rather simple growth model which is a modified neoclassical 
approach. The analysis presented also puts the focus on the issue of optimum growth, 
namely that capital intensity which maximizes steady state per capita consumption. Some 
new ideas are presented here. 
Compared to the US, the EU has achieved only modest growth in the 15 years following 
1990. Brazil, Russia, India, and China have strongly contributed to global economic 
growth after 1998, and in 2006 the BRICs indeed have accounted for slightly more than 
half of global economic growth. High oil and gas prices after 2001 have stimulated growth 
of output in countries richly endowed with natural resources; this includes not only Russia, 
Brazil, Mexico and the OPEC countries but also gas producing countries in the former 
Soviet Union. Russia is the world’s largest gas producer and accounted for a share of 26% 
of global reserves, it reserve to production ratio reached 78 at the end of 2006 which is 
higher than the global average of 63 (BP, 2007); Russia’s role in the oil sector also is 
important as it accounted for 7% of global reserves, the reserve to production ratio reached 
22 in 2006 which was below the global average of 41. Thus Russia can be expected to 
remain a large producer and exporter of gas and oil for many decades. While there is little 
doubt that an expansion of the energy sector can contribute to a transitory spurt in 
economic growth – possibly over several decades – there are doubts whether or not the 
exploitation of non-renewable natural resources is an ideal basis for long term economic 
development and growth, respectively.   
The quantity of natural resources which could be exploited in the long run often are much 
larger than simple extrapolation of reserve-consumption ratios suggest since technological 
progress in exploration and exploitation of such resources can be high; this holds 
particularly since increased long run scarcity of natural resources imply a relative rise of 
global resource prices which in turn make advanced exploration and exploitation 
technologies profitable. The effective reserves thus can increase over time – possibly for 
many decades. Technological progress (which could be endogenously modeled in the 
context of new growth approaches) thus helps to effectively reduce the depletion rates of 
resource sites; an alterative view is that progress enlarges over time those resource sites in 
terms of reserves. However, at some future point there will be a declining exploitation ratio 
and backstop technologies have to be considered more seriously.   
1 At the beginning of the 21
st century it is remarkable that global consumption of fossile 
energy resources in a given year is equivalent to the “creation” of such resources in one 
million years in the past. Resource rich countries as well as major energy importers among 
advanced OECD countries have become increasingly interested in the issue of raising 
energy efficiency and resource efficiency in the 1990s; partly as a response to the signature 
of the Kyoto protocol and the fear of global warming: eg the British government – facing a 
medium term decline in oil production as well as new global challenges - has emphasized a 
new framework for sustainable consumption and production (DTI/DEFRA, 2003; STERN, 
2006). The Italian environmental agency also has considered new options for a sustainable 
use of natural resources in Italy (CASCONE ET AL. 2006). The efforts of leading OECD 
countries in energy innovation could dampen the global long run increase in global energy 
consumption, however, given the enormous growth dynamics in China, India and many 
other Asian and African and Latin American countries the global demand for energy and 
natural resources could increased for many decades. 
In Western Europe sustained growth has become an important topic, namely in the sense of 
raising the growth rate as was emphasized in the EU’s Lisbon Agenda with its focus on an 
expansion of the digitally networked knowledge society (internet users density see figure 
9). As regards the Euro zone, the relative income gap vis-à-vis the US increased 
considerably in the last two decades of the 20
th century. In 2006 and 2007, however, 
Euroland’s growth seemed to match that of the US and even to temporarily overtake it – 
with good prospects for enhanced growth in the medium term. Interestingly, the number of 
jobs created in the period 1999-2006 reached more than 10 million and thus exceeded the 
number in the US (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2007, p.3). In the EU, Germany suffered 
from rather low growth in the decade after the German unification boom 1991-93; Italy 
also has had rather modest growth rates, which raises in both countries the issue of 
structural change, productivity growth and output growth. By contrast, France, Spain, 
Ireland, Greece and Finland have recorded rather high growth rates; the UK and Sweden 
also recorded sustained growth over the decade following 1995. Among the eastern 
European accession countries Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and 
Poland have experienced relatively strong growth in the decade following 1995 after 
systemic transformation and economic opening up as well as EU membership in 2004. 
Russia has experienced high growth in the decade after the crisis of 1998 into which the 
economy fell not least due to poor advice of the IMF who had argued in favor of 
introducing fixed exchange rates which, of course, is totally in contrast to the optimum 
currency literature – in particular the KENEN criterion which says that only countries with 
a diversified export basis should have fixed exchange rates. 
At the beginning of the 21
st century, the US is the only superpower and the dominant 
global source country of foreign direct investment. For a few decades it is unclear whether 
the world economy will be characterized by stability: the US might engage in a quasi-
imperial overstretch, as it is the only superpower; the rise of new challengers might also 
generate impulses for instability. China which already has become a leading regional Asian 
power, is likely to become a long term rival of the US. The subsequent table (ignoring 
military power) gives a few key figures for large economies in the world. 
2  
The US leads with a share of about 1/5 of global GDP – on the basis of purchasing power 
parity figures. China already has come close to the economic size of Euroland in 2001-05. 
Russia’s share in world GDP is growing gradually. 
 
Table 1: Role of Large Economies in the Global Economy (% of global total) 





























22.5 20.5 27.9 30.1 15.7 11.6 15.6 19.7 44.4 
Euro area
1 21.3 15.7 20.2 21.9 21.2 18.5 21.2 16.9 15.3 
Japan  8.0 6.7 7.5 11.6  8.5 7.4 7.9 5.8 9.4 
United 
Kingdom 
4.3 3.1 3.7 4.9 6.9 4.7 7.9 5.6 7.5 
China
2 3.0 14.0  2.6 4.6 1.2 7.2 1.3 6.2 1.9 
Canada  2.1 1.9 2.7 2.4 5.7 4.4 5.5 4.0 2.8 
Mexico  1.7 1.8 1.3 1.8 0.5 2.7 0.8 2.9 0.5 
Russia* -  2.4 -  1.3 -  1.6 -  1.3 - 
Korea  0.6 1.6 0.3 1.7 0.7 3.1 0.9 2.7 1.1 
India  3.5 5.7 1.7 1.6 0.7 1.0 0.8 1.2 0.8 
Brazil  2.7 2.7 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.9 0.9 0.8 
1 Excluding intra-euro area trade, 2 Data in 1971-75 columns are for 1976-80 
Source: IMF (2007, pp. 122/123); * 2007 for Russia; according to World Development Indicators 
 
Whether Russia can restore its old superpower status in the medium term is doubtful and 
depends to some extent on sustained economic growth – in 2003 the per capita income of 
Russia was close to that of Mexico, and such a low income is certainly not an economic 
basis for being a political superpower in the narrow sense (given Russia’s geopolitical 
position, however, the country certainly is a leading global power, although its potential 
will be fully exploited only once it is more active in international organizations such as the 
WTO, the BIS or the OECD). However, Russia might achieve high long term growth and 
this in turn could be crucial for its political weight. A major problem of Russia’s growth in 
the decade after 1998 concerns the fact that the energy sector has played a key role for 
economic growth. To some extent growth driven by the energy sector is normal in a 
country richly endowed with natural resources and the energy sector could play an 
important role for economic expansion: both through the sectoral growth and via 
associated impulses for other sectors on the one hand, on the other hand via the easing of 
3 the current account constraint and opportunities to import capital equipment and 
knowledge from abroad. At the same time one should not overlook the risk that lack of 
modernizing the manufacturing sector based on “home-grown” entrepreneurship and 
innovativeness will bring about a specialization which will be difficult to correct in the 
medium term and long run; at least to the extent that path-dependencies could strongly 
restrict ability to create a broader industrial sector with technology-intensive and 
knowledge-intensive production.  
In the decade after 1998 economic restructuring and gains from trade have contributed to 
economic growth. After 2001 high relative oil prices – and high gas prices – have 
stimulated investment in the natural resources sector which in turn has enormous backward 
linkages and forward linkages. One may assume that about 1/3 of economic growth is 
determined by the energy sector in Russia in 1998-2007. 
The US represented about 30% of global GDP at the beginning of the 21
st century if we 
focus on figures at market exchange rates (figures for the US are expressed in $, figures for 
the Euro area in Euro and then converted at the current exchange rate into US dollars, 
figures for China are expressed in Yuan and then converted into US dollars….; then the 
shares of individual countries in world GDP are calculated). However, the US share in 
world GDP is lower within the PPP concept: it is 1/5 of the world economy’s gross 
domestic product if one uses purchasing power parity figures – that is if one controls for 
differences in the price of nontradables across countries (e.g. the price of a hair cut in 
China is lower than in the US and so are rents for apartments: adjusting for such 
international differences allows to compare income figures of individual countries). The 
output share of the – hypothetical – Euro area in the early 1970s was close to that of the 
US, while at the beginning of the 21
st century it was 5 percentage points behind that of the 
US (20.5%), whose growth performance had been much higher in the 1990s than in the 
Euro area. At the beginning of the 21
st century, the share of Japan in global output is 7%, 
the share of the UK is about 3%. China has increased its share in three decades by roughly 
ten percentage points and stood at 14% in the period 2001-05. Canada, Mexico and Korea 
each account for about 2%; India was close to 6% and Brazil as well as Russia close to 
2.5% at the start of the 21
st century.  
In the following analysis we will briefly look at the theory of economic development and 
growth, respectively; the distinction between the level of the growth path and the trend 
growth rate itself is emphasized here. As regards the perspectives for long term economic 
growth the neoclassical growth model considered suggests that the growth path adopted in 
the period 1998-2007 – much emphasizing a strong and expanding role of the natural 
resources sector – is not sustainable. If one takes into account the true savings rate of 
Russia, namely official savings plus private spending on education minus the depletion rate 
of natural resources (and the emission ratio) the level of the growth rate will decline in the 




2.  Basic Reflections on Economic Growth 
Long term economic growth of output and per capita income are important from a 
policymaker’s perspective, but it is not an end in itself. In a normative perspective, one 
may argue that 
•  long term output growth should be sustainable so that the relevant output figure is 
not gross domestic product but net domestic product. In our analysis we will, 
however, emphasize that net domestic product – as usually defined in the Systems 
of National Accounts – is not an adequate output category, rather one should focus 
on “net-net income” (net-net income and net-net savings refers to a broader concept 
of depreciations; see below); 
•  basically people are interested in long term per capita consumption which leads to 
the topic of optimum growth theory, namely to achieve that capital intensity K/L 
(with K and L denoting capital and labor, respectively) which maximizes per capita 
consumption C/L (C denoting real consumption) in the steady state 
In a nutshell, long term growth is linked to supply-side dynamics and the macroeconomic 
production function for output Y, respectively, where the latter can be summarized as 
(1)   Y= Y(K, L, H, A, N, T, Ω, M/P, E, Ф) 
where input variables K, L, H, A, N, T, Ω, M/P, E, Ф stand for capital, unskilled labor, 
skilled labor, technology, infrastructure capital, the use of telecommunications, 
technological specialization, real money balances (M is the stock of money, P the price 
level; m=: M/P), energy and the “institutional capital”, respectively. In a broader 
perspective one may emphasize some standard features of growth accounting and some 
more recent insights: 
•  While capital K, labor L (and H) and the level of technology A – proxied, for 
example, by the number of patents – are standard variables in growth theory, the 
role of infrastructure capital N is not fully clear in the literature as the empirical 
evidence is mixed when authors look for a direct impact of N on output. However, 
an essential part on the output effect of higher N certainly is linked to growing 
trade and the associated improvement in diffusion of knowledge and enhanced 
specialization. The institutional variable Ф also is likely to cause some problems in 
institutional analysis as its supply-side effects could be mainly occurring in an 
indirect manner, e.g. by raising the output elasticity of some or all factors. 
Moreover, an efficient set of institutions (say, concerning elements of the legal 
system) could also be factor-augmenting – e.g. an efficient legal system will allow 
firms to avoid complex and recurrent legal conflicts which allows in the overall 
economy for the employment of fewer people as lawyers and bodyguards but more 
people in the direct production of output. 
•  As regards L+H the demographical factor partly will influence its development 
over time. With respect to K, H and A accumulation is necessary so that this takes 
time and investors willing to accumulate. A knowledge capital stock can be 
accumulated through expenditures on research and development (R&D): Here both 
5 private R&D expenditures and government R&D expenditures are crucial as are 
government subsidies for private sector R&D, namely to the extent that there are 
positive external effects of private R&D. If accumulation of R&D capital is not 
explicitly modeled – as an exception see e.g. WELFENS/JUNGMITTAG (2001) – 
the role of R&D is reflected in the residual of empirical growth accounting models: 
in the so-called total factor productivity which summarizes not only the R&D 
impact but also other elements relevant for the expansion of output. 
•  Recent empirical findings for Germany have also pointed to a significant role for 
the use of telecommunications, which obviously signifies knowledge diffusion 
effects (WELFENS/JUNGMITTAG, 2002). For other industrialized countries a 
similar result should be expected. 
•  To the extent that increasing trade in intermediate products within global 
multinational production networks contributes to higher global output it is 
important to consider the growing role of offshoring (production in foreign 
subsidiaries) and international outsourcing (KLODT, 2007; KLEINERT, 2004). 
There might be positive static and dynamic scale effects as well as network effects 
(dynamic growth effects on the demand side as in the case of the use of 
telecommunication networks) related to the size of regional integration clubs. 
•  In an institutional perspective membership of Russia in international organizations 
is quite important since this amounts to an institutional anchor: membership in 
WTO and OECD therefore is quite important – these institutions also stand for new 
opportunities for Russia to contribute to shaping regulations and rules in important 
areas such as telecommunications, electricity and railways 
(WELFENS/YARROW/GRINBERG/GRAACK, 1999; 
LANE/ODING/WELFENS, 2003; GRAHAM/ODING/WELFENS, 2005).  
•  The energy sector offers input which is crucial for specializing in energy intensive 
industries and it also is important for exports for resource rich countries. The more 
Russia would like to develop a specialization in the field of technology and 
knowledge intensive products the more important will be government policies 
which encourage R&D and higher education. The specialization of Russia on the 
EU15 market in the decade after 1993 is strong in resource intensive products and 
in resource & scale intensive products (positive modified RCAs; RCA is revealed 
comparative advantage). For a transition period it seems realistic to expect that 
profits from the energy sector will stimulate innovation dynamics – in particular in 
the energy sector which partially is both capital intensive and technology intensive. 
If Russia were to switch to a more knowledge and technology intensive production 
it would have to achieve a positive modified RCA (sectoral export-import ratio of 
Russia relative to EU15 export-import ratio in the EU15 market) and also rising 
export unit values (EUVs) in science based products in scienced based product and 
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7 •  From a theoretical perspective, one should emphasize that real money balances 
should have a positive effect on output as the use of money allows one to save 
information and transaction costs; in a monetary growth model it has been shown 
that under certain parameter conditions the stock of real money m (m=: M/P) 
indeed can raise the equilibrium capital intensity so that the so-called Tobin-
paradox of having a lower capital intensity in monetary economy than in a barter 
economy is avoided (WELFENS, 2007); also it has been argued that institutions 
matter for the level of productivity and hence long run development of per capita 
income. Finally, one may argue on the basis of theoretical and empirical arguments 
that trade is relevant for the expansion of output (JUNGMITTAG, 2006). 
COE/HELPMAN (1995) have shown that foreign research and development (R&D 
of trading partners) positively affects total factor productivity. 
BALDWIN/SEGHEZZA (1996) have presented similar evidence and shown that 
this trade-related spillover effect is particularly strong for EU countries – thus 
network effects, embodied technology or dynamic effects of import competition 
might matter here. HENREKSON/TORSTENSSON/TORSTENSSON (1997) also 
present empirical evidence for EU countries and EFTA countries that the growth 
rate of GDP is positively influenced by regional integration. VANHOUDT (1999) 
puts the focus on EU countries and does not find an EU-related growth effect. 
JOHANSSON (2001) finds in his study of four large EU countries a positive link 
between imports and growth – with intra-EU-imports showing a stronger effect 
than extra-EU imports. 
One may consider value-added as a two-stage production process where the production of 
intermediate products and services (which include banking services) is assumed to use 
money as an input factor – once that the economy switches from a barter economy to a 
monetary economy. The switching from a barter economy to a monetary economy and 
hence introduction of money in a non-inflationary economy has two consequences, namely 
to reduce production costs of intermediate products and to reduce information costs on the 
demand side.  
In the EU countries the role of an increasingly knowledge-based production has been 
emphasized. As regards the European Commission and the European Council, the topic of 
EU growth is clearly emphasized in the EU Lisbon Agenda of 2000, which aims at making 
the EU the most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. In this 
context, diffusion of new knowledge and technological progress are quite important. The 
number of patent applications (ideally stock figures) at the USPTO shows that the US is 
well ahead of Europe, and this holds even if we would correct for the home bias in 







  Table 2: Patents Granted to USA, Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Sweden, 
China and Russia at the US Patent Office 
 
 2003-2005  Average
Germany 10411 
USA 82267 
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3.  Selected Theoretical and Empirical Aspects of Economic 
Growth 
3.1 Theoretical  Aspects 
Understanding long term economic growth is not possible without growth theory, which 
basically puts the focus on the supply-side; in contrast, short-term and medium term 
growth analysis will often take into account a demand side perspective. In certain cases, 
both perspectives can be adequately combined (WELFENS, 2007). The standard analysis 
of supply-side oriented growth theory is summarized in AGHION/DURLAUF (2005) and 
additional ideas are discussed in EICHER/RÖHN (2007) and ALGAN/CAHUC (2007). In 
modern Economics there often is a strong emphasis on the microeconomic foundation of 
Macroeconomics which certainly is useful for many issues. However, one may raise some 
doubts as to whether typical assumptions about economic agents maximizing profits or 
utility over infinite horizons are always adequate. At least in the context of business cycle 
dynamics, one will often find that relevant time horizons are changing and that a 
shortening of time horizons and a sudden rise of risk premiums in capital markets can play 
an important role. (The subprime housing market crisis in the US in summer 2007 is 
indeed a good example for a major confidence crisis that started in the US, then affecting 
many banks and countries.) For long term growth analysis, the assumption of long term 
planning of households and firms is rather convincing. However, it is also adequate to call 
for a Macroeconomic foundation of Microeconomis (see appendix); there is a mutual need 
for consistency. 
An important aspect of growth interdependence in the world economy is related to the 
relative size of countries as measured by real GDP on the basis of purchasing power parity. 
In the context of a simple two-country model, the world GDP Y## = Y + q*Y* (with Y* 
denoting GDP in country II and q*=: eP*/P the real exchange rate where e is the nominal 
exchange rate and P the price level); hence the growth rate – g denotes growth rates – of 
the world economy is calculated as gY##= εgY + (1-ε)[gY* +gq*], where ε is the share of Y 
in world GDP. Let ε denote the share of OECD GDP in global income – about 40% at the 
beginning of the 21
st century. Taking into account that the world growth rate will 
increasingly be determined by Asia and that Asian growth rates (which might be around 
5% in the medium term), at least for one or two decades, might well exceed that of OECD 
countries, it is clear that Asia will increasingly affect the development of global economic 
growth (here we ignore potential long term changes in the real exchange rate). This, 
however, does not imply that Asian economic dynamics will dominate the world economy 
around 2030 or 2040 unless the weight of Asian stock markets in global stock markets – as 
measured by stock market capitalization – should strongly increase; here world markets are 
still dominated by the US. 
What determines economic growth in the long run? The standard neoclassical growth 
model is a useful starting point for our analysis and can be extended in various ways, e.g. 
by considering more input variables than just capital, labor and knowledge. Economic 
growth must be carefully considered in various ways. One important aspect concerns the 
11 distinction between the level of the growth path and the trend growth rate (the growth path 
itself). The distinction becomes clear if we briefly recall the neoclassical standard growth 
model based on the following assumptions (with e’ denoting the Euler number): 
•  production function is linear-homogeneous; we will use Y=K
ß(AL)
1-ß; 0<ß<1 
•  savings S=s(1- τ)Y where τ is the income tax rate and the savings rate s is in [0,1] 
•  equilibrium condition for the goods market which is S= investment I where I is the 
sum of net investment dK/dt and capital depreciations δK (δ is depreciation rate) 
•  growth rate of labor (L) is exogenous, namely dlnL/dt=n; 
•  growth rate of knowledge (A) is exogenous: dlnA/dt= a: hence A(t)=A0e’
at 
•  the steady state ratio Y/(AL)=:y’ = [s(1-τ)/(a+ δ+n)]
 ß/1-ß 
•  per capita income in the steady state is y# =:Y/L= {[s(1-τ)/(a+δ+n)]
 ß/1-ß A0}e’
at. 
Hence the growth rate of the per capita income y in the steady state is equal to “a”. At the 
bottom line, the level of the growth path is given by the bracket term {…} and the long 
term trend growth rate is given by a. Hence a rise in the savings rate s, a fall in the tax rate 
τ, a fall in the depreciation rate δ and in the population growth rate n will raise the level of 
the growth path of per capita income. The growth rate of real GDP is given by the sum of a 
and n. The above per capita equilibrium will also hold for an open economy as long as 
there is no foreign direct investment and as long as we assume a balanced trade account 
and a balanced government budget as long run constraints for economic policy (see on this 
and a potential trade-related impact of trade WELFENS (2007)). 
In a lny-t diagram (see a) in the following diagram) we may consider a country which 
experiences an upward shift in the level of the growth path in a certain point of time (tI) – 
see the switch from point B to B’ – while the growth rate (the slope of the line: see tg α) 
remains the same. At a later point of time tII there could be a rise in the progress rate a so 
that there is a downward shift in the level of the growth path combined with a steeper slope 
(tg α’). It will take some time until – in tIII – per capita income on the new path is higher 
than it would have been under the old regime. In panel b) we have shown the case that 
there is a simultaneous increase in the level of the growth path and the trend growth rate, 
so that the overall path of y is given by ABC’E. 
 
12  
Figure 6: Change in the Level of the Growth Path (a) and the Trend Growth Rate (b) 
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Policy measures such as a cut of the tax rate or incentives designed to increase the savings 
rate s raise the level of the growth path. One should not, however, overlook the fact that 
specific tax incentives – tax rebates for firms investing in R&D – can also affect the trend 
growth rate a. 
An exogenous increase in the trend growth rate “a” will obviously reduce the level of the 
growth path and raise the trend growth rate at the same time. In a politico-economic 
system, which is extremely short-sighted, a policy option to increase “a” will not seriously 
be considered, as the short-term effect of a fall of the growth rate will dominate. However, 
politicians who take a long term perspective will clearly favour options that raise the trend 
growth rate since over time a rise in the trend growth rate dominates the short-term fall of 
the level of the growth rate.  
Cross-country empirical analyses as well as panel analyses of economic growth typically 
suffer from a specific problem, namely that they do not apply a double test on structural 
breaks. There could be a structural break with respect to:  
•  the level of the growth path; 
•  the trend growth rate; 
•  both the level of the growth path and the growth rate itself. 
We can learn from empirical analysis only if the sample of countries considered is rather 
homogeneous and if adequate dummy variables for trend breaks have been used. 
One should emphasize that in an open economy context with foreign direct investment one 
will have to carefully make a distinction between gross domestic product and gross 
national product where GNP per capita will normally exceed GDP per capita if the country 
considered is a net investor in the world economy (e.g. the case of US or the Netherlands 
or Germany as opposed to the UK, Ireland, Italy or China – the latter four countries all 
13 being important host countries for foreign direct investment). Disregarding international 
labor mobility one may state for the case of a pure source country of foreign direct 
investment: the gross national product Z is the sum of Y (GDP) and profits accruing from 
abroad which under certain conditions are proportionate to foreign gross domestic product 
Y*. If there is two-way foreign direct investment it is naturally net international profit 
accruing which has to be taken into account. 
Efficient versus Optimal International Specialization 
In the traditional optimum growth theory (following the golden rule established by 
PHELPS and VON WEIZSÄCKER) it is emphasized that the steady state ratio of capital 
to labor in efficiency units is not necessarily identical to that ratio k’#opt which maximizes 
long term per capita consumption and the level of the growth rate of per capita 
consumption. As per capita consumption is maximized if k’# is such that at this ratio the 
slope of the tangent at the production function is equal to n+a+δ we face an interesting 
problem – not treated in the literature thus far – with respect to international specialization 
once we implicitly consider a two-sector economy: The initial “non-golden intersection 
points” of the curve sk’
ß and the (n+a+δ)-line in country I and of s*k’*
ß* and the 
(n*+a*+δ*)-line in country II could be such that k’#0 exceeds k’*#0 so that – according to 
the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson approach – the home country should specialize in capital-
intensive goods and country II in labor-intensive goods; while a corresponding adjustment 
might bring specialization gains for both countries and thus effectively raise the progress 
rate in both countries.  
In an open economy there is, however, the topic of optimum international specialization 
which is not trivial at all since – as is argued here – it is not easy to determine which 
country has a relatively higher capital intensity:  the term relative capital intensity indeed 
might refer to the actual capital intensities abroad or at home; alternatively, one may want 
to focus on the capital intensities occurring in a (hypothetical) global state of the golden 
age which maximizes per capita consumption in both countries. Global golden state is 
defined here in that way that both countries are in the golden age; that is the golden rule 
has been realized in all countries (the respective capital intensity of this optimum state is 
denoted as k
opt). If the respective golden rule capital intensities k’
opt and k’*
 opt, 
respectively, are such that the relative ordering changes, namely k’
opt < k’*
 opt  
(alternatively, initially k’#0 < k’*#0 while in simultaneous golden rule states: k’
opt > k’*
 opt), 
we have an interesting ambiguity about efficient international specialization (here we are 
not dealing with the relatively trivial case that there is no qualitative difference between 
initial ratios in a steady state and the ratio of steady states in the golden global age). While 
initial non-golden steady states in both countries have implied that country I should 
specialize on capital intensive goods while country II should specialize on labor intensive 
goods, the global golden rule suggests just the opposite: Country I should specialize in 
labor-intensive goods production while country II should specialize in capital intensive 
production (see the subsequent graph).  A global golden state may be dubbed Golden 
Optimal Specialization. 
If adjustment costs from switching from capital-intensive specialization to labor-intensive 
specialization would be rather high it might be even advisable – assuming a rather short 
political capitalization horizon in both countries – to stick to the initial non-golden 
specialization. As a policy implication one may conclude that government planning 
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intervention in catching-up countries are wise to consider options to realize the golden rule 
from the outset; and this all the more the poorer the respective country is. If more 
developing countries were to follow the golden rule there obviously would be less 
starvation and malnutrition (and migration) in the world economy since per capita 
consumption levels in poor countries would be higher than otherwise. For development 
policy the topic discussed here also could be quite interesting since it does not make much 
sense to give high development aid to poor countries whose governments are unwilling to 
move the economy into the gold age as defined by growth theory. It would be a useful task 
of the World Bank to calculate the conditions for fulfilling the golden rule in various 
countries. Countries willing to indeed implement the golden rule should get a bonus in 
development aid. In a broader perspective it would be useful if all OECD countries and 
indeed many other countries would calculate the golden rule capital intensity. 
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15 If both firms and countries undertake specialization according to the golden age rule 
abroad and at home we have “golden efficient specialization” and such a state of the world 
economy indeed is desirable from a normative point of view – assuming that governments 
(and indeed voters) want to maximize sustainable per capita consumption.  
  
3.2  Endogenous Growth Models and Empirical Issues 
In endogenous growth models, the term “a” is no longer exogenous but explained – e.g. by 
the ratio of R&D expenditures to GDP or the share of researchers in the overall labor force. 
There is a broad range of endogenous growth models (BRETSCHGER, 2004) which 
basically emphasize several potentially important drivers of the trend growth rate: 
•  the non-rivalry of technology and hence of technology spillovers across both 
sectors and countries; 
•  the possibility that individual firms’ capital formation creates positive spillover 
effects so that the aggregate marginal productivity of growth does not decline 
(ROMER, 1986); 
•  the role of product differentiation in intermediate products on the basic of an R&D 
sector (ROMER 1990) which allows for the production of more variants of 
heterogeneous goods, which in turn stimulates demand and hence output growth; 
•  the role of static and dynamic scale economies – the latter refers to learning-by-
doing effects as emphasized by ARROW (1962), which are particularly important 
for certain sectors, including automotive, air and space sector as well as ICT; 
•  the role of human capital formation as emphasized, for example, by LUCAS (1988) 
and ROMER (1990a). In the approaches of ROMER (1990b) and 
AGHION/HOWITT (1992) the idea of NELSON/PHELPS (1966) is picked up, 
namely that human capital is necessary for both R&D and innovations. As a result, 
the growth rate of output depends on the level of human capital. It is a priori 
unclear whether human capital formation affects the level of the growth path or – 
through increasing the rate of technological progress – the trend growth rate. If 
human capital is an input like other standard variables, the growth rate of output 
depends on the growth rate of human capital (as in LUCAS, 1988; for a discussion 
of both approaches see CANNON, 2000). The empirical evidence on the US 
suggests that the growth rate of human capital has an impact on the growth rate of 
output (JONES, 1995).  
This reasoning implies that government has a role with respect to the growth rate, as 
government is typically much involved in the education system and also subsidizes R&D 
in most OECD countries; and this is justified from an economic perspective to the extent 
that there are positive external effects of private R&D. 
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3.3 Sustainability  Issues 
Considering the topic of long term growth and sustainability – in a broader sense – one will 
have to take into account several aspects: 
•  Even if relatively high long term growth can be achieved there is the potential 
problem of inequality dynamics; growth might lead to a higher inequality which 
normally is not a problem unless it exceeds a critical dimension and unless 
government is not engaged in adequate redistribution policies. In a normative 
perspective one may state that such policies should try to avoid negative incentives 
for investors and innovators. From a more philosophical perspective – picking up 
the Theory of Justice of RAWLS (1971) who argued in his “difference principle” 
that inequalities should be accepted provided that they also contribute to improving 
the economic position of the poorest strata – one might emphasize that growth 
should go along not only with a rise in average per capita income but also in per 
capita income of the poorest strata in society. 
•  High growth over some decades will not be sustainable if there are high and 
growing emissions of particulates or CO2 and other greenhouse gases. From this 
perspective the concept of sustainable growth leads to the issue of emissions but 
also to some other questions, including those related to energy issues. There is 
hardly any doubt that the ratio of global reserves to global consumption is likely to 
be rather stable for many years to come - according to statistics of BP (2007) that 
ratio is about 40 for oil and about 60 for gas. However, there are opportunity costs 
to the depletion of natural resources and those often are not considered, and we will 
see that one may argue that depletion of natural resources affects the true net 
savings ratio. 
As regards the level of the growth path the savings ratio is decisive. The higher the savings 
rate the higher the level of the growth path in the steady state/the long run equilibrium. 
While it is true that other variables also influence the level of the growth path one should 
emphasize that the savings rate clearly is a variable which government can influence in 
various ways. Moreover, economic integration can affect the savings ratio: With a more 
integrated system of banks and financial markets – e.g. as in the euro area and the EU, 
respectively – one should anticipate a fall of the savings ratio, namely for two reasons: 
•  In a more integrated market, competition is more intensive and this will lead to 
reduced intermediation costs and hence a rise of the effective savings rate (in a 
growth model one may argue that savings S=s(1-ρ)Y where ρ – in the interval 0,1 – 
is a measure of inefficiency); 
•  In a more competitive integrated market it will be easier for both firms and 
households to obtain loans so that savings of private households are likely to fall.; 
•  If financial market integration amounts to a positive impulse for economic 
expansion so that real asset prices increase, one should expect that savings – indeed 
the savings ratio S/Y – will fall, namely if one assumes that real wealth negatively 
affects savings (current savings typically are used to bridge the gap between current 
real wealth and an exogenous wealth target). We can see that after the start of the 
17 Euro, the national savings rate decreased slightly in both Germany and the euro 
area. But after 2005, we have seen a rise in the savings rate over several years 
which, however, mainly reflects government budget consolidation efforts (in the 
subsequent graph the sum of private savings and government savings relative to 
GDP are shown). 
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The neoclassical model will lead for the case of a production function Y= K
ß(AL)
1-ß and a 
gross savings rate s and population growth rate n to the following term for the level of the 
per capita income growth path (under the equilibrium conditions savings equals investment 
which is the sum of dK/dt and δK, where δ is the depreciation rate): A0[s/(a+n+δ)]
ß/1-ß ; this 
can approximately be rewritten for the simple illustrative case n+a=1 as A0 s(1-δ). Clearly, 
the higher the depreciation rate of capital, the lower the level of the growth path. Since net 
GDP Y”=: Y-δK, we have (with y’=: Y/(AL), k’=:K/(AL)) for the steady state  
 
y”#=:Y”/(AL) = y’- δk’ = k’
ß - δk’ = [s/(a+n+δ)]
ß/1-ß - δ[s/(a+n+δ)]
1/1-ß










2 is close to zero – that is if the depreciation rate is rather small – we can use 
the approximation: 
lny” - ln[s/(a+n+δ)]
  ≈- δ[s/(a+n+δ)]
2
lny” ≈ ln[s/(a+n+δ)]
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We can thus clearly see that the depreciation rate strongly affects the level of net GDP per 
capita. Net GDP per capita (y”) is a crucial economic variable since it is only y” whose 
production can be sustained, namely if there is adequate reinvestment which must be equal 
to capital depreciations (in the former GDR this condition was neglected in many years and 
in some years the government decided to manipulate the capital stocks statistics by 
effectively imposing a negative depreciation rate so that mysteriously the capital stock had 
increased). The traditional economic analysis looks only at capital depreciations, but this is 
an incomplete picture of reality; particularly if the country considered is exploiting non-
renewable natural resources. At the same time the traditional concept of savings – as 
applied in the System of National Account – is incomplete since private expenditures on 
education are not considered. 
Hence it holds: If there are other input factors which are depleted – such as non-renewable 
energy or mineral resources – the concept of sustainable growth will have to not only 
consider depreciation of capital but also the depletion of energy resources and of mineral 
resources. To put it differently, the true net savings rate – referring to our illustrative case – 
differs from s(1-δ): The true net savings rate will be lower, and hence the level of 
sustainable growth is lower, than simply looking at capital depreciation suggests. At the 
same time a true net savings rate will have to include private expenditure on education as 
an item which raises true savings above the traditional savings ratio (as shown in the 
systems of national accounts). 
Indeed, there can be sustained growth of both output and consumption only if there is 
adequate reinvestment. Reinvestment in standard growth models refers strictly to capital, 
that is equipment and machinery plus buildings/real estate. If one wishes to assess the long 
term consumption opportunities of a closed economy – with a given population –, he or she 
must substract reinvestment per capita from per capita production. True net savings of 
many countries are much lower if one not only considers allowances for capital 
depreciation but also the depletion of non-renewable energy resources plus mineral 
resources and allowances for emissions of particulates and CO2; at the same time it is 
important to add expenditures of human capital formation if one is to derive true net 
savings as calculated by the WORLD BANK (2006). True savings relative to real income 
is 12.7% in Canada instead of 11.5%, the official number published for 2004.  For the US 
true savings is 8.2%, which is somewhat higher than the official figure of 5.7%. In France 
the true savings ratio is 14.3% which is much above the official figure of 9.4%. In Kuwait 
the official figure was 33.5%, while the true net savings rate was -12.9% which indicates 
that economic expansion in Kuwait is not sustainable in the long run. Taking a look at EU 
figures we generally see rather favorable growth prospects in many EU15 countries in 
terms of sustainability as proxied by the true savings ratio of the World Bank. China, 
19 which has a very high true savings rate, could face some problems in the future as the 
burden of emissions of particulates and CO2 will rise; at the same time one may expect 
China to spend more on education in the future. 
 
Table 3: Official Savings and True Savings Relative (World Bank Concept) to Gross 
National Income in Selected Countries, 2000 



























Canada  24,6 4,9  13,1 0,2  0,0  4,9  0,2 0,4  11,5 12,7 
USA  17,4 4,2  17,4 0,0  0,0  1,2  0,3 0,3  5,7  8,2 
Mexico  21,0 5,0  10,6 0,1  0,0  5,9  0,5 0,4  10,4 8,4 
Russia  37,1 3,5  10,0 0,4  0,0  39,6  0,6 3,4  27,1 -13,4 
France  22,0 5,1  12,6 0,0  0,0  0,0  0,0 0,2  9,4  14,3 
Germany  20,3 4,3  14,9 0,0  0,0  0,1  0,1 0,2  5,4  9,3 
UK  15,0 5,3  11,5 0,0  0,0  1,1  0,1 0,2  3,5  7,3 
Italy  20,1 4,4  13,7 0,0  0,0  0,1  0,2 0,2  6,5  10,3 
Kuwait  40,0 5,0  6,5  0,0  0,0  48,7  2,0 0,6  33,5 -12,9 
Indonesia  21,0 1,4  5,6  1,4  0,0  12,5  0,5 1,1  15,4 1,3 
China  38,8 2,0  8,9  0,3  0,1  3,6  1,0 1,6  29,8 25,5 
Source: WORLD BANK (2006) 
 
While the growth rate of many OECD countries does not seem to be very high compared to 
newly industrializing countries, one should not overlook that EU growth is rather 
sustainable. This suggests that Europe faces favorable prospects for long term growth. The 
only caveat concerns the long term decline in population and the problem of ageing 
societies. As the “leading ageing” OECD country, Japan, has shown at the beginning of the 
21
st century, however, even with an ageing and declining population a country can achieve 
sustained per capita income growth.  
Russia’s economic expansion is not sustainable in the long run – say after 2050 – since it 
seems not realistic to expect that exploitation of natural resources can be maintained over 
many decades. The true net savings ratio calculated above is negative and reaches about -
13% at the beginning of the 21
st century. Comparing China and Russia one should not rule 
out that the growth of China is more sustainable than that of Russia. In any case the 
Russian government would be wise to increasingly emphasize innovation policy and 
higher R&D expenditures both in the public sector and the private sector. However, one 
should not confuse effects on the level of the growth path and the relevance of the trend 
growth rate itself. The true net savings ratio affects the level of the growth path. Only the 
education expenditures are somewhat ambiguous since one cannot rule out that with 
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respect to the growth rate of technological progress there is a positive interaction between 
R&D expenditures – relative to GDP – and the share of skilled labor and tertiary education, 
respectively. 
Russia’s economic development will hardly be weakened much if the energy sector’s 
output share in GDP would gradually decline. If one assumes that the growth rate of 
knowledge is largely determined by expenditures on education and research & 
development as well as international trade – read the import of technology-intensive 
products – Russia could sustain high growth rates. This holds for the case that government 
sets adequate budget priorities and stimulates expenditures on research and development 
through subsidies aimed at internalizing positive external effects of innovation. Classical 
Russian strength in the education system (and emphasis on mathematics and natural 
sciences) should be a fruitful basis not least for expansion of the information and 
communication technology (ICT) sector which has become the most dynamic sector in 
terms of innovation performance in the EU at the beginning of the 21
st century – and the 
same holds for the US. The new Russia has favourable long term opportunities for long 
term growth, but a rise of internet user density and of host density are high should be high 
on the agenda of policymakers (see appendix). As regards the options for raising 
productivity the diffusion of knowledge through the use of ICT is important as could be the 
production of ICT goods; the latter field will be, however, difficult to enter since there is 
strong competition in world markets. While hardware is a particularly difficult field 
software could be more interesting, at the same time it is clear that here one is facing 
strong global competition in the long run. High Schumpeterian rents could be earned. 
A decline of the natural resources sector and demographic problems will undermine 
economic expansion only transitorily. This implies a rather favourable long term economic 
outlook for Russia. There is, however, a certain caveat, namely whether or not Russia’s 
financial system will be able to come up with adequate financing for innovative small 
firms. The rule of law is another critical area, in particular for the creation and expansion 
of young firms in the ICT sector. More integration with the EU also could be useful for full 
exploitation of digital networking in the 21
st century. 
Stimulating joint international research in energy R&D through government subsidies – 
aiming at internalizing positive external effects of innovation – could be useful for many 
reasons: Besides internalizing positive external effects in a strictly economic sense it could 
contribute to more long term cooperation among countries; such cooperation in R&D 
might in turn contribute to more long term stability in the world economy. 
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